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MUNICIPAL LAW-How BROAD A REMEDY? MUNICIPAL LIA
BILITY AND THE MASSACHUSETTS CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
INTRODUCTION
Jane and Lena both live in Massachusetts, where, in identical
situations, each was threatened with arrest for lawful activity in vio
lation of her civil rights. Afterward, both filed lawsuits against the
individuals who made the threat, as well as the individuals' employ
ers. Jane's suit was successful. The individual perpetrator was judg
ment-proof, but the employer paid damages. After paying the
damages, the employer implemented a new training program to
prevent future employee violations.
Lena was also awarded damages, but she never received a
dime. The individual was judgment-proof, and her case against the
employer was dismissed before trial. The employer made no
changes to training or supervision to prevent future incidents.
What caused the different outcomes on nearly identical facts?
In Jane's case, the employee was a security guard who worked for a
private employer, while in Lena's case, the employee was a police
officer employed by a municipal corporation.
Did the Massachusetts legislators who passed the Massachu
setts Civil Rights Act (MCRA)l in 1979 intend such disparate out
comes? Is it possible that they were concerned only with the
prejudice of private individuals and did not wish to provide incen
tives for cities and towns to protect the civil rights of all Massachu
setts citizens? This Note argues that the answer to both questions is
no: the legislature intended to pass a bill that would provide protec
tions for the civil rights of Massachusetts citizens in as broad a
range of settings as possible, including settings in which the em
ployer is a municipal entity. Specifically, this Note argues that mu
nicipal corporations should be treated as any other "persons,"
subject to the same liability, including respondeat superior liability,
as individuals and non-municipal employers under the MCRA, and
that such a reading is consistent with the Act's intended purpose.
Part I of this Note explores the historical background of the
MCRA, beginning with an exploration of 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (§ 1983),
1.
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the federal civil rights act on which the MCRA was modeled. 2 A
brief overview of the legislative history of § 1983 is followed by a
discussion of § 1983 case law, culminating with the 1978 Supreme
Court decision, Monell v. Department of Social Services. 3 The Note
then addresses the legislative history of the MCRA and case law
relevant to a discussion about whether the word "person," as used
in the MCRA, includes municipalities.
Part II of this Note analyzes the competing considerations at
play when determining legislative intent and argues that the Massa
chusetts state and federal district courts have erred in entirely ex
cluding municipalities from the reach of the MCRA. Excluding
municipalities from the reach of the MCRA deprives some plain
tiffs of a remedy available to other plaintiffs-damages from the
employer of an employee who violated the plaintiff's civil rights
while on the job. A further result is that municipalities have less
liability for the civil rights violations committed by their employees
than do private employers and, therefore, less financial incentive to
ensure that employees are properly trained and supervised to avoid
violations. Although municipalities are liable under § 1983, they
are generally not subject to vicarious liability for the acts of em
ployees. 4 As a result, the harms of excluding municipalities from
the reach of the MCRA are not remedied by the existence of lim
ited federal liability for municipalities.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON FEDERAL AND
STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION

Brief Overview of the Legislative History of 42 U.S.c. § 1983

A.

The history of the MCRA begins with 42 U.S.c. § 1983. The
core statutory language of § 1983 was originally passed as part of
the Ku Klux Act, now also called the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 5 As
the original title suggests, the Act was passed in response to the
racially motivated violence for which the Ku Klux Klan was
known. 6 The first section of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, since
2.
3.

Id.

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
5. James J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 HARV.
c.R.-c.L. L. REV. 393, 410 (2003).
6. 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL
RIGHTS 591 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970).

4.
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codified as § 1983,7 permitted a person who had been deprived of
his or her civil rights "under color of any law" to bring suit in fed~
eral court against the person who had caused the deprivation. 8
This new civil cause of action complemented the existing fed~
eral criminal penalty for civil rights violations, thus providing a
remedy for victims even where local law enforcement refused to
act.9 After little debate, section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871

7. An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti
tution of the United States and for Other Purposes, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codi
fied as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000». Other sections of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 have been codified. Section 2 is codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000) and
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2000); section 6 is codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1986 (2000).
8. The text of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act)
provided:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any per
son within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States,
shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such pro
ceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United
States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and
other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of
the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled "An act
to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish
the means of their vindication"; and the other remedial laws of the United
States which are in their nature applicable in such cases.
An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States and for Other Purposes, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000».
9. Section 2 of The Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or
Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to
different punishment, pains or penalties on account of such person having at
any time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or
by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white
persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). Similar language is now codified
at 18 U.S.c. § 242. The introductory language was clearly the source for the analogous
language in section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See supra note 5. However, the
rights protected in 1866, prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, were
based in the statute itself, rather than the Constitution.
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was passed as introduced.lO There was, however, considerable de
bate about various versions of section 6 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, especially the Sherman Amendment.!! Those debates have
fueled judicial disagreement about the interpretation of the word
"person" in § 1983.12
Under Senator Sherman's proposed amendment, all residents
of a "county, city, or parish" were made liable for damages caused
by "any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled."13 The
Senate approved the Sherman Amendment, but the House of Rep
resentatives rejected it.!4 Later, the Conference Committee dis
seminated a revised version that would have made the "county, city,
or parish" itself liable for the damages.!5 Legislators in the House
gave significant attention to the Conference Committee version of
the Sherman Amendment before, again, rejecting it.1 6 Ultimately,
Congress adopted section 6 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which
allowed suits against those who had power and knowledge but
failed to act to prevent civil rights violations.17 As revised, section 6
made individuals with the ability to prevent civil rights violations
liable for any violations that occurred, and eliminated the type of
collective liability suggested by Senator Sherman.1 8 In 1961, the Su
preme Court ruled that the rejection of the second version of the
Sherman Amendment showed that the legislature did not intend
municipalities to be liable under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.1 9 In
1978, however, the Supreme Court revisited the meaning of the de
10. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 665-66 (1978) (citing
CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 522); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171
(1961) (citing CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568).
11. For a thorough discussion of the Sherman Amendment, its sources, and the
debate surrounding its adoption, see Russell Glazer, Note, The Sherman Amendment:
Congressional Rejection o/Communal Liability For Civil Rights Violations, 39 U.c.L.A.
L. REv. 1371,1394-1406 (1992).
12. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188-91.
13. CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871).
14. Glazer, supra note 11, at 1401 (citing CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663).
15. Id. (citing CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663, 707, 725).
16. Id. at 1402 n.161, 1403.
17. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 6, 17 Stat. 13, 15 (1871) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1986 (2000». Specifically, section 6 allowed suits, brought
within a year, against a "person or persons, [who] having knowledge that any of the
wrongs conspired to be done ... [was] about to be committed, and having power to
prevent or aid in the preventing of same neglect or refuse so to do." [d.
18.

[d.

19. Monroe V. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-83 (1961); see also infra notes 35-41 and
accompanying text.
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bate about the Sherman Amendment, and came to a different
conclusion. 20
B.

Interpreting § 1983: Monroe and Monell

In Monroe v. Pape, the plaintiffs brought suit against the City
of Chicago and a group of its police officers alleging that the of
ficers violated their civil rights guaranteed under the United States
Constitution. 21 The complaint alleged that in the early hours of the
morning, a group of thirteen Chicago police officers, acting without
a warrant, entered their apartment, woke them and their children,
and made them stand naked in their living room. 22 The officers
proceeded to "ransack[ ] every room, emptying drawers and ripping
mattress covers. "23 One of the plaintiffs, Mr. Monroe, claimed he
was held at the police station for ten hours without access to an
attorney and with no opportunity to call his family, in further viola
tion of his civil rights. 24 The district court dismissed the claims
against the city and the officers, holding that § 1983 was not vio
lated because the officers' actions were illegal and therefore not
carried out "under color of" state law. 25
When the district court entered its ruling, case law interpreting
the phrase "under color of state law" limited application of the stat
ute to challenges of written policies that, on their face, violated in
dividuals' federal rights. 26 The Supreme Court had, however,
rejected a similarly narrow interpretation of the same phrase used
in a criminal context in 18 U.S.c. § 242.27 Under § 242, state of
20. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,664-83 (1978); see also
infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
21. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 168-69.
22. /d. at 169.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 170.
26. Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Be
yond, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 277, 283-84 (1965) (noting that Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268
(1939); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); and Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368
(1915) all involved acts by officials enforcing unconstitutional state laws).
27. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (finding, in a criminal case,
that "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only be
cause the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken under
color of state law"). 18 U.S.c. § 242 reads in full:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Posses
sion, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se
cured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to
different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an
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ficers are presumed to have acted "under color of" state law, even if
their activities violated state law, so long as their "possession of
some state authority" facilitated their illegal acts.28 In Monroe, the
Court adopted that interpretation of § 1983, explaining that both
§ 1983 and § 242 took the phrase "under color of" state law from
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and, therefore, the "phrase should be
accorded the same construction in both statutes. "29 The Court also
noted that the legislature had ample time to reword either statute in
the years since the phrase was given an expansive meaning under 18
U.S.c. § 242.30
Thus, Monroe enabled plaintiffs to bring suit against govern
ment officers whose actions did not comply with state law. How
ever, Monroe also made it more difficult for some victims to get
relief. After adopting a broader definition of "under color of state
law," the Supreme Court went on to narrow the meaning of the
word "person" as used in § 1983, holding that municipalities were
not "persons" who could be sued under the statute. 31 As a result,
Monroe made it impossible for plaintiffs to sue a municipal govern
ment directly under § 1983, even if employees acting in the course
of their employment caused the civil rights violation. 32
alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment
of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation
of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts
committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an
attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggra
vated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or
imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to
death.
18 U.S.c. § 242 (2000). Section 242 is derived from the second section of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and, as noted by Justice Douglas in Monroe, the "under color of any
law" language is identical to the language in § 1983. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 185.
28. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 288-89 (1913)
(defining "state action" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment). The definition was
applied to 18 U.S.C. § 242 in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). The correla
tion between the interpretation of "state action" and "under color of state law" was
explicitly noted by the Supreme Court when it decided United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787, 794 n.7 (1966).
29. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 185.
30. Id. at 186-87 (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945».
31. Id. at 190-92 (permitting suit against individual police officers but dismissing
claims made directly against the city for whom the officers worked).
32. Harold F. McCart, Jr., Case Note, Damages May Be Recovered From a Police
Officer Who Conducts an Unlawful Search and Seizure, 12 MERCER L. REv. 410, 412
(1961) (evaluating the impact of Monroe).
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Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas interpreted the word
"person" in light of the debates about the second version of the
Sherman Amendment,33 and the ultimate adoption of different lan
guage in section 6. 34 According to Douglas, the rejection of the
Sherman Amendment showed that a majority in Congress was
against making municipalities liable for deprivations of civil rights
occurring within their borders. 35 Because "[t]he response of the
Congress to the proposal to make municipalities liable ... was so
antagonistic," Justice Douglas concluded "we cannot believe that
the word 'person' was used in [§ 1983] to include
[municipalities]."36
In addition to relying on the Sherman Amendment debates,
the Court could have looked to An Act prescribing the Form of the
enacting and resolving Clauses of Acts and Resolutions of Con
gress, and Rules for the Construction thereof (hereinafter Federal
Dictionary Act).37 The Federal Dictionary Act, which was adopted
just months before the Civil Rights Act of 1871, established defini
tions for words used in federal laws. 38 Under the Act, the defini
tion of "person" "extend[ed] and ... appl[ied] to bodies politic and
corporate."39 Since municipalities, also known as municipal corpo
rations,40 are both political and corporate bodies and § 1983 applies
equally to all persons, adoption of the Act's definition of "person"
would have subjected municipalities and individuals to the same lia
bility under § 1983.41
33. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
34. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188-91.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 191.
37. An Act prescribing the Form of the enacting and resolving Clauses of Acts
and Resolutions of Congress, and Rules for the Construction thereof, ch. 71, 16 Stat.
431 (1871) (current version at 1 U.S.c. § 1 (2000)) [hereinafter Federal Dictionary Act).
Congress adopted a revised set of definitions in 1947. General Provisions, ch. 388, § 1,
61 Stat. 633, 633 (1947); Rules of Construction for Acts of Congress, ch. 645, § 6, 62
Stat. 859 (1948). Currently "the words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as
well as individuals." 1 U.S.c. § 1 (2000).
38. The Federal Dictionary Act, ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431, was enacted February 25,
1871, and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.c. §§ 241-42, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)), was enacted April 20, 1871.
39. Ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431 (1871).
40. A municipality is a municipal corporation or "[t]he governing body of a mu
nicipal corporation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1043 (8th ed. 2004). A municipal cor
poration is, in turn, "a city, town, or other local political entity." Id. at 1042.
41. Indeed this was the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court when it de
cided Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 688-89 (1978).
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But the Federal Dictionary Act, Justice Douglas argued,
"merely [provided] an allowable, not a mandatory" definition for
the word "person. "42 In other words, the Federal Dictionary Act
provided a presumptive definition that could be disregarded by
demonstrating an alternative legislative intent. 43 Justice Douglas
wrote that the debate about the second version of the Sherman
Amendment provided ample evidence that the legislature intended
to use a narrower definition of the word "person" than the one re
cently codified. 44
Justice Douglas's analysis did not hold up. In 1978, following a
seventeen year assault on Monroe,45 the Supreme Court overruled
Monroe's exclusion of municipal liability, in Monell v. Department
of Social Services .46 In Monell, a group of female employees sued
the school board and its chancellor, the Department of Social Ser
vices along with its commissioner, and the City of New York for
damages after they were forced to take medically unnecessary, un
paid leave during pregnancy.47 The district court found that the
policy of forced leave violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 48
However, the court denied their claims for back pay because the
City would have had to pay the damages and, as a municipality, the
City was not liable under Monroe. 49 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed, specifically holding that neither the City,
the Department of Social Services, nor the Board of Education
were "persons" who could be reached by § 1983. 50 The Supreme
Court reversed. 51
42. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961); see also ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431, § 2
("The word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate.").
43. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 19l.
44. Id. at 187-90.
45. See, e.g., Karen M. Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of
Municipal Liability in Federal Courts, 51 TEMP. L. REV. 409, 412-14 (1978); see also
infra note 217 and accompanying text. Some lower courts challenged Monroe either by
recognizing the scholarly critique of Monroe, or by carving out exceptions to the gen
eral rule against municipal liability articulated in Monroe. See, e.g., Carter v. Carlson,
447 F.2d 358, 369-70 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (carving out an exception to the Monroe rule
against municipal liability in the case of the District of Columbia); Hogge v. Hedrick,
391 F. Supp. 91, 96 n. 3 (1975) (noting the scholarly criticism of the legislative history
analysis that formed the basis of Monroe).
46. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
47. Id. at 660-61.
48. Id. at 661-62. The policy, in fact, had been changed while the litigation was
pending. [d.
49. [d. at 662.
50. Id.
51. [d. at 702.
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Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan thoroughly reviewed
the debate surrounding the Sherman Amendment and the wording
eventually adopted in section 6 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 52
He concluded that the Monroe Court had incorrectly identified the
concerns legislators had with the Sherman Amendment53 and that
neither the debates about the Sherman Amendment nor those
about § 1983 provided clear evidence that legislators intended to
define "person" as excluding municipalities. 54
Justice Brennan wrote in the first part of his opinion: "Our
analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and
other local government units to be included among those persons to
whom § 1983 applies."55 Since the civil rights violations at issue in
Monell resulted from a municipal policy, the Supreme Court re
versed the lower courts' decisions not to award back pay.56 The
Court's decision could have ended here and Monell would have
opened the door for municipal liability in a wide range of contexts,
including respondeat superior liability.57 Instead, in the second part
of the opinion, Justice Brennan indicated that municipal liability for
employee conduct should be limited to those acts that furthered "a
government's policy or custom."58
The importance of the dicta concerning the "policy or custom"
requirement was unclear at the time Monell was decided because
those terms were not defined. 59 Monell did, however, eliminate a
52.
53.
54.
55.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 665-83.
at 679.
at 688.
at 690. In his analysis, Justice Brennan noted that the definition of "per
son" found in the Federal Dictionary Act should apply to § 1983 in part because the
Federal Dictionary Act was "passed only months before the Civil Rights Act was
passed." [d. at 688.
56. [d. at 695.
57. Respondeat superior is "[t]he doctrine holding an employer or principal liable
for the employee's or agent's wrongful acts committed within the scope of the employ
ment or agency." BLACK'S LAW DlcrJONARY, supra note 40, at 1338. Vicarious liabil
ity is "[l]iability that a supervisory party (such as an employer) bears for the actionable
conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an employee) based on the relationship
between the two parties" and includes respondeat superior liability. Id. at 934.
58. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
59. The Monell "policy or custom" test has come to mean that "municipalities
may not be held vicariously liable for the conduct of municipal employees but rather
can be held liable only when municipal policy is the moving force behind the violation."
Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 48 DEPAUL L.
REV. 627, 627 (1998-99). While the rule may be restated relatively easily, it has resulted
in "a highly complex body of interpretive law." Bd. of the County Comm'rs v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 430 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Both the "policy or custom" test and
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clear barrier to bringing a successful § 1983 claim against a munici
pality. Using the definition of "person" appearing in the Federal
Dictionary Act, the Court overruled Monroe and brought munici
palities under the scope of § 1983.

C.

Enactment of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act

Six months after the Supreme Court decided Monell, upon the
petition of Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti, members of the
Massachusetts General Court introduced House Bill 3135 (H.R.
3135), "to further regulate the protection of the civil rights of per
sons in the Commonwealth."60 H.R. 3135 passed without debate or
amendment by voice votes in the Senate and House of Representa
tives. 61 The governor signed the bill into law less than two weeks
after it arrived on his desk. 62 The bill added both civil remedies and
criminal penalties for certain types of civil rights violations. 63 Two
civil remedies provided by the bill make up the Massachusetts Civil
Rights Act. The first authorizes the Massachusetts attorney general
to bring a civil suit for injunctive or other equitable relief
"[w]henever any person or persons, whether or not acting under
color of law, interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion, or atthe Monell limitation on municipal liability have been criticized by Justices of the Su
preme Court and in numerous law review articles. See, e.g., id. at 430-31 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); id. at 430 (Souter, J., dissenting); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Beermann, supra; Stephen J. Shapiro, Public
Officials' Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Actions Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald and
its Progeny: A Critical Analysis, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249 (1989); Blum, supra note
45. Additionally, determining whether the "policy or custom" test applies in a particu
lar case, by at least one estimate, saps significant resources from federal district courts.
David F. Hamilton, The Importance and Overuse of Policy and Custom Claims: A View
From One Trench, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 723, 724-25 (1998-99). Together, these factors
indicate why Massachusetts plaintiffs would be significantly helped by inclusion of mu
nicipalities within the MCRA.
60. JOURNAL OF TIlE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF TIlE COMMONWEALTII OF
MASSAcHUSETfS 1979, at 2856 (1979); Legislative Packet for 1979 Mass. Acts 915, 171st
Gen. Court, Leg. Sess. (on file at the Massachusetts Archives) (copy on file with West
ern New England Law Review).
61. Id. Had there been any proposed amendments, debate, or a roll call vote, the
published legislative history would contain references to the procedural processes in
volved. Specifically, if there had been a roll call vote, the specific results would have
been printed. The Senate passed H.R. 3135 on July 31, 1979, and the House of Repre
sentatives passed H.R. 3135 on November 4, 1979. Id.
62. Id.
63. The bill had two sections: the first provided civil remedies through two
amendments to chapter 12 of the Massachusetts General Laws, and the second pro
vided criminal penalties through an amendment to chapter 265 of the Massachusetts
General Laws. H.R. 3135.
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tempt to interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion, with the ex
ercise or enjoyment by any other person or persons of rights
secured" under federal or state law. 64 The second enables victims
of the same type of conduct to sue the perpetrator directly.65
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated in Batchelder
v. Allied Stores Corp. that the legislature intended the MCRA to
"provide enhanced protection of civil rights."66 Tracing the in
tended reach of the MCRA is difficult because the legislative re
cord does not include records of debates or discussions concerning
the scope of the bil1. 67 However, some information about the pur
pose of H.R. 3135 and the response generated as the bill worked its
way through the legislature survives in the Governor's File 68 and
the published record of the legislative action. 69
Among the materials in the Governor's File are three docu
ments that provide the most authoritative information about the
scope of H.R. 3135 intended by the attorney general.7o In a letter
to two members of the General Court, Attorney General Bellotti
stated the purpose of the bill in broad terms, writing that H.R. 3135
was "a comprehensive bill to protect the civil rights and civilliber
ties of persons in the Commonwealth."71 He described how the bill
would address the needs of both the attorney general's office and
individual victims by authorizing the attorney general to act, while
allowing individuals to pursue justice for themselves.72 Robert H.
Bohn, Jr., Chief of the Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Division of the
Department of the Attorney General, reiterated those points in tes
64. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 11H (2004).
65. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 111 (2004).
66. Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 473 N.E.2d 1128, 1129-30 (Mass. 1985). For
a discussion of Batchelder, see infra text accompanying notes 84-96.
67. Legislative Packet for 1979 Mass. Acts 915, 171st Gen. Court, Leg. Sess. (on
file at the Massachusetts Archives) (copy on file with Western New England Law Re
view). The file contains the text of the bill, a listing of actions taken, brief statements
from the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate Committee on Senate
Ways and Means recommending passage, and a record of passage in both the House
and the Senate. [d.
68. Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915 (on file at the Massachusetts
Archives).
69. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS 1979, at 2856 (1979).
70. Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915.
71. Letter from Francis X. Bellotti, Att'y Gen. of the Commonwealth of Mass., to
Sen. Alan D. Sisitsky & Rep. Michael Flaherty, Joint Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 7,
1979) (on file at the Massachusetts Archives in the Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts
915) (copy on file with Western New England Law Review).
72. Id.
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timony before the Joint Committee on the Judiciary.73 Thomas R.
Kiley, First Assistant Attorney General, echoed Bellotti and Bohn
when he urged the governor to sign H.R. 3135 in a letter dated
November 8,1979.74
Also among the papers in the Governor's File are a number of
letters urging adoption of H.R. 3135. 75 These letters provide con
temporary impressions of the purpose and reach of the language
that became the MCRA and indicate that public debate about H.R.
3135 included discussion of federal civil rights laws like § 1983.76
Several letters supported the creation of a state civil cause of action
to supplement federal law, not simply because the state law would
reach private actors, but because the law would give victims access
to state courts.77 The only letter urging the Governor to veto H.R.
73. Robert H. Bohn, Jr., Chief of the Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Division of the
Dep't of the Attorney Gen. of the Commonwealth of Mass., Testimony Regarding
House Bill No. 3135 Before the Joint Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 7, 1979) (on file at
the Massachusetts Archives in the Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on
file with Western New England Law Review). Bohn also explained that while it was
important to provide the Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Division in the Department of the
Attorney General specific authority to initiate court action to remedy or enjoin civil
rights violations, the individual civil remedy was important to shifting some of the en
forcement burden away from the Department. Id.
74. Letter from Thomas R. Kiley, First Assistant Att'y Gen. of the Common
wealth of Mass., to Neil Lynch, Counsel to the Governor 3 (Nov. 8, 1979) (on file at the
Massachusetts Archives in the Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on file
with Western New England Law Review).
75. Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915. Specifically, the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary received letters supporting the bill from Greater Boston Legal Ser
vices, the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, and the League of Women Voters.
Id. Thomas McGee, Speaker of the House of Representatives, received letters from
Action for Boston Community Development, Massachusetts Federation of Teachers,
the Superintendent of the Boston Public Schools, and the Boston Police (signed by both
the mayor and police commissioner). Id. The Governor received letters from the Mas
sachusetts Law Reform Institute, the Boston City Council (including a copy of a resolu
tion in favor of the bill approved by the Boston City Council), and Action for Boston
Community Development. Id.
76. See generally Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915.
77. See, e.g., Letter from Robert M. Coard, Exec. Dir., Action for Boston Cmty.
Dev., to Thomas W. McGee, Speaker of the Mass. H. of Reps. (Aug. 6, 1979) (on file at
the Massachusetts Archives in the Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on
file with Western New England Law Review) (supporting H.R. 3135 because it would
enable poor people to seek redress in state rather than federal courts); Letter from Am.
Jewish Congo to Gov. Edward J. King (Nov. 8, 1979) (on file at the Massachusetts
Archives in the Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on file with Western
New England Law Review) (referring to federal civil rights proceedings as slow and
cumbersome); Letter from Allan G. Rodgers, Dir., Mass. Law Reform Inst. to Gover
nor's Legal Counsel (Nov. 9, 1979) (on file at the Massachusetts Archives in the Gover
nor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on file with Western New England Law
Review) (noting the difficulties of litigating civil rights violations in federal court).
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3135 also addressed the relationship between federal and state civil
rights law, asserting that the adequacy of federal law made state
legislation unnecessary. 78
Other documents in the Governor's File indicate that the Gov
ernor also evaluated H.R. 3135 in reference to federal civil rights
law. 79 The documents include an article by Justice Brennan urging
states to adopt civil rights protections beyond those afforded by the
federal government,80 the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 U.S.c. § 242,
42 U.S.c. § 1983, and 42 U.S.c. § 2000a-5, and information on re
cent Supreme Court cases. 81 Taken together, these materials pro
vide a snapshot of contemporary thoughts, inside and outside state
government, that influenced the enactment of the MCRA and pro
vided the basis for later judicial interpretation of its scope. 82
D. Judicial Interpretation of the MCRA
Courts have interpreted the scope of the MCRA in cases in
volving a number of related issues. 83 Later cases have built on the
earlier analyses, notably that of Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp. 84
Batchelder involved a request for attorney's fees pursuant to the
MCRA85 by a plaintiff who had previously received declaratory re
78. Letter from Katherine P. Healy, Vice Pres., Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. to
Gov. Edward J. King (Nov. 13, 1979) (on file at the Massachusetts Archives in the
Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on file with Western New England Law
Review) (urging veto because federal laws were adequate and state law, as drafted, was
unconstitutionally broad).
79. See Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915.
80. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
81. Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915.
82. Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 473 N.E.2d 1128, 1129-30 (Mass. 1985) (cit
ing Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) ("The Legislature passed this statute to
respond to a need for civil rights protection under State law.").
83. See, e.g., Duarte v. Healy, 537 N.E.2d 1230 (Mass. 1989) (addressing whether
the MCRA implicitly incorporated qualified immunity modeled on federal qualified
immunity (yes)); Chicopee Lions Club v. Dist. Att'y for Hampden Dist., 485 N.E.2d 673
(Mass. 1985) (addressing whether MCRA includes absolute prosecutorial immunity
(yes)); Sarvis v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 711 N.E.2d 911 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999)
(addressing whether the MCRA holds private employers liable for employees' civil
rights based on respondeat superior liability (yes)).
84. Batchelder, 473 N.E.2d at 1128, cited with approval in Bally v. Ne. Univ., 532
N.E.2d 49 (Mass. 1989); Duarte, 537 N.E.2d 1230; Sarvis, 711 N.E.2d 911; Howcroft v.
City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).
85. Chapter 12, section 111 of the Massachusetts General Laws provides individu
als with a right to bring private actions seeking remedies for the civil rights violations
described in that section. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 111 (2004). In addition to author
izing such actions, section 111 provides that "[a]ny aggrieved person or persons who
prevail in an action ... shall be entitled to an award of the costs of the litigation and
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lief on state constitutional grounds. 86 The trial court denied the
plaintiff's request for attorney's fees because the judgment for the
plaintiff was only based on constitutional grounds, not on the
MCRA claim.87 The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, ruling that
the definition of "prevail" used in the MCRA has its source in 42
U.S.c. § 1988. 88
Based on the legislative history and wording of the MCRA, the
Batchelder court asserted that the MCRA was modeled after
§ 1983. 89 As a result, the court concluded, interpretations of terms
and ambiguities in the federal law should be applied to the
MCRA.90 The court also wrote that, following canons of construc
tion, the MCRA, like other civil rights statutes, should be construed
broadly to reflect the remedial intent of the legislature. 91 Thus,
Batchelder identified two guides for determining the scope of the
MCRA.92 First, courts could look to federal civil rights laws be
cause the private remedy authorized by the MCRA was meant to
be "coextensive" with § 1983, except that the MCRA also applies to
reasonable attorney's fees in an amount to be fixed by the court." Id.; see also supra
text accompanying notes 64-65.
86. Batchelder, 473 N.E.2d at 1128; see also Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc.,
445 N.E.2d 590, 590-91 (Mass. 1983). The plaintiff in Batchelder filed suit after a private
security guard at a private mall told him he was not permitted to solicit signatures and
distribute leaflets in support of his candidacy for Congress. Batchelder, 445 N.E.2d at
591. In his suit, Batchelder alleged that the security guard's actions violated his rights
under both the MCRA and the Massachusetts state constitution. Id. at 590-91. Batch
elder sought a declaratory judgment that he had a right to solicit signatures and dis
tribute literature in the mall. Id. at 591. The lower court denied relief and Batchelder
appealed. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court granted Batchelder declaratory relief solely
on constitutional grounds. Id. at 590-91. The court was only considering a request for
declaratory relief at that time so it did not need to consider whether the MCRA would
have provided grounds for additional relief. Id. at 591 n.2.
87. Batchelder, 473 N.E.2d at 1129.
88. /d. at 1130. The relationship between 42 U.S.c. § 1988 and 42 U.S.c. § 1983
is analogous to the relationship between chapter 12, section 111 and section 11H of the
Massachusetts General Laws, in that § 1988, like section 111, establishes a right to attor
neys' fees for plaintiffs who successfully pursue claims under the associated section.
89. Id. at 1128-30. "[T]he Legislature intended to provide a remedy under [chap
ter 12, section 111 of the Massachusetts General Laws], coextensive with 42 U.S.c.
§ 1983, except that the Federal statute requires State action whereas its State counter
part does not." Id. at 1131 (citation omitted); see also Lyons v. Nat'l Car Rental Sys.,
Inc., 30 F.3d 240, 246 (1st Cir. 1994), overruled by Sarvis, 711 N.E.2d 911 (refusing to
permit MCRA liability based on respondeat superior because MCRA mirrors § 1983
under which respondeat superior is not a basis for liability); Chaabouni v. City of Bos
ton, 133 F. Supp. 2d 93,100-01 (D. Mass. 2001) (citing to Batchelder for the proposition
that the MCRA and § 1983 provide similar protections).
90. Batchelder, 473 N.E.2d at 1130.
91. Id. at 1130-31.
92. Id.
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private actors. 93 Second, courts could construe the terms of the
MCRA broadly because the MCRA, like other civil rights statutes,
was remedial in nature. 94 In Batchelder, both interpretive ap
proaches led to the same outcome. 95 By adopting the federal defi
nition of "prevail," the court also provided a liberal interpretation
of that term in the MCRA.96 However, later cases have shown that
adopting interpretations from federal civil rights law can sometimes
conflict with a liberal interpretation of the MCRA.97
In Duarte v. Healy, the Supreme Judicial Court advanced the
view that § 1983 case law should apply to the MCRA.98 In Duarte,
the plaintiff, a former firefighter, sought damages from the city
manager and fire chief who ordered drug testing that violated his
civil rights. 99 The Supreme Judicial Court determined that the qual
ified immunity for discretionary functions 1OO enjoyed by public em
93. Id. at 1131. Additionally, as the court noted, the MCRA contains a require·
ment that any actionable interference with a person's civil rights be "by threats, intimi
dation or coercion, or attempt to interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion." MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 11H (2004). Section 1983 does not contain such a requirement. 42
U.S.c. § 1983 (2000).
94. Batchelder, 473 N.E.2d at 1130-31.
95. Id.
96. Id. (allowing plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees by adopting the definition of
"prevail" from 42 U.S.c. § 1983).
97. Compare Duarte v. Healy, 537 N.E.2d 1230 (Mass. 1989) (dismissing com
plaint because Massachusetts legislature intended to import federal concept of qualified
immunity in the MCRA, even though the text mentions no immunities and such immu
nities limit victims' ability to recover damages), with Sarvis v. Boston Safe Deposit &
Trust Co., 711 N.E.2d 911 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (allowing plaintiff to recover because
Massachusetts legislature intended private employers to be subject to respondeat supe
rior liability for employees' violations even though employers are not subject to respon
deat superior liability under § 1983).
98. Duarte, 537 N.E.2d 1230.
99. Id. at 1231-32.
100. At common law, various governmental officials enjoyed different levels of
immunity from liability for actions carried out while working. Charles R. Wilson, "Lo
cation, Location, Location": Recent Developments in the Qualified Immunity Defense,
57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 449-50 (2000). Though § 1983 contains no mention
of immunity for governmental actors, the Supreme Court has incorporated the concept
into § 1983 jurisprudence since 1967. Id. (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)).
The idea that government employees should be immune from liability for most discre
tionary actions, which are those actions that are within the scope of employment but
not clearly required, was later reaffirmed. Id. (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975)). The rationale for such immunity is that government employees should gener
ally be free to use discretion in carrying out job functions without fear of liability. Id.
The defense is unavailable to government employees who act maliciously in violating a
person's rights or where the rights violated have been "clearly established." Id. A
more detailed discussion of the concept of qualified immunity for discretionary func
tions is beyond the scope of this Note. For a further discussion of immunity under
§ 1983, see id. at 449-55.
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ployees under § 1983 applied equally to the MCRA.IOl Presuming
the legislature was aware of the case law establishing qualified im
munity under § 1983, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that by pat
terning the MCRA on § 1983, the legislature intended to adopt
analogous immunity, even though the language of the MCRA does
not mention immunities.102
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit fol
lowed the Duarte reasoning in Lyons v. National Car Rental Sys
tems, Inc.10 3 There the court rejected a claim against a private
employer based on respondeat superior liability because Monell,
which predated the MCRA, had also rejected respondeat superior
liability.104 The First Circuit ruled that Monell applied equally to
private employers because the ruling addressed "the language and
legislative history of section 1983, not .. , principles-such as sov
ereign or qualified immunity-applicable only to governmental en
tities."lo5 The court said that because the state legislators who
adopted the MCRA modeled it on § 1983, they intended to follow
Monell and reject respondeat superior liability.106
In 1999, the Massachusetts Appeals Court rejected the federal
court's Lyons reasoning in Sarvis v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust
CO.107 Sarvis involved a suit by the children of a man who de
faulted on the mortgage of their home.108 An affiliate of the bank
obtained the home at a foreclosure sale and employees of the bank
took actions to sell the house.109 The bank did not, however, take
101. Duarte, 537 N.E.2d at 1232 (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975),
as the source of qualified immunity under § 1983).
102. Id. Indeed this paralleled the process in the Supreme Court where the com
mon law immunity doctrine was grafted onto § 1983 despite the absence of any mention
of immunity in § 1983. Wilson, supra note 100, at 449-50.
103. Lyons v. Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc., 30 F.3d 240 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying
Massachusetts law in a diversity case that included a claim under the MCRA).
104. Id. at 246.
105. Id. at 246-47. The court recognized that the Monell discussion of the legisla
tive history of § 1983 explicitly applied only to governmental entities. Id. However, the
court said that the Monell reading of the legislative history of § 1983 showed "that
Congress declined to make municipalities vicariously liable under § 1983, despite argu
ments that vicarious liability would reduce the incidence of unconstitutional acts and
would spread the cost of injuries throughout the community." Id. According to the
court, such a rejection indicated an unwillingness to hold employers liable and spread
liability costs, concerns equally applicable to private employers. Id.; see also Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978).
106. Lyons, 30 F.3d at 246.
107. Sarvis v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 711 N.E.2d 911, 920-21 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1999).
108. Id. at 915.
109. Id.
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proper steps to evict the plaintiffs from the home. 110 Instead of in
stituting summary process proceedings against the plaintiffs, an em
ployee of the bank and a real estate agent hired by the bank took
various steps to cause the plaintiffs to vacate the house, including
having the locks changed, charging the plaintiffs with trespassing,
sending cleaning personnel to remove the plaintiffs' belongings, and
threatening the plaintiffs with arrest.lll
The Sarvis court allowed the plaintiffs to recover damages
from the bank, holding that the bank was vicariously liable for the
acts its employee and real estate agent carried out in its service. 112
The court explicitly found that the MCRA had a broad remedial
purpose and, as a result, should receive a "liberal construction. "113
In this case, that meant permitting respondeat superior liability,
even though it would conflict with § 1983 case law predating the
MCRA. Rather than framing the issue as whether the legislature
intended to incorporate the Monell limit on vicarious liability, the
court asked whether the legislature intended to exclude liability
long established under the common law, even as it introduced a
new remedy.114 The court justified applying the established com
mon law to the MCRA because expanding the reach of the MCRA
was consistent with its remedial purpose. 115
In addition to relying on the established nature of respondeat
superior liability in Massachusetts and the remedial intent of the
legislature, the court based its decision on the actual language of
the statute.H 6 The court focused on the application of the MCRA
to "persons."117 Like the federal government, Massachusetts de
fines words commonly appearing in legislation in a "dictionary"
statute (hereinafter MDS).1 18 According to the preamble of the
110.
111.
112.

Id. 915-16.
Id.
Id. at 920-21.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 920.
117. Id.
118. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7 (2004). The abbreviation "MDS" for "Massa
chusetts dictionary statute" is used here for simplicity, though the statute itself does not
have an official title. The MDS was first codified in its current form and location in
1921. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 4, § 7 (1921). In using the definition from the MDS to guide
interpretation of a term in the MCRA, the court was making an argument similar to
that made by Justice Brennan in Monell, that the Federal Dictionary Act should be the
source of the meaning of the word "person" as used in § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 688-89 (1978). While Justice Brennan emphasized the
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MDS, the defined terms "shall have the meanings [therein] given,
unless a contrary intention clearly appears."119 Since 1921 the MDS
has provided that" '[p]erson' or 'whoever' shall include corpora
tions, societies, associations and partnerships. "120 According to the
court in Sarvis, the MDS establishes that the MCRA applies to cor
porations (and societies, associations, and partnerships) even
though they can act only through their agents. 121 Without respon
deat superior liability, the MCRA would apply to corporations and
yet be unable to reach them. 122 To prevent this frustration of the
MCRA, the court concluded that private employers were subject to
respondeat superior liability for their employees' MCRA
violations. 123

Sarvis directly addressed only private employers.124 However,
in a footnote the court suggested public employers might not be
subject to respondeat superior liability under the MCRA because
"person" has not "ordinarily be[en] construed to include the State
or political subdivisions thereof. "125 Sarvis was not the first case to
ask whether the MCRA applies to municipalities. In 1996, the Su
preme Judicial Court explicitly declined to decide the question in
Swanset Development Corp. v. City of Taunton. 126 Writing for the
court, Justice Greaney explained that the court had transferred the
case "principally to consider whether a municipality should be con
sidered a 'person' for the purposes of liability under the [MCRA],"
but, because the issue had not been adequately briefed, the court
declined to decide the questionP7 Since Swanset, the Supreme Ju
dicial Court has not addressed the issue; however, in 2001 both the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and
the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that municipalities are not
"persons" subject to liability under the MCRA.128
temporal proximity of the passage of the Federal Dictionary Act and § 1983, the Massa
chusetts court glossed over the many years that separated the passage of the MDS defi
nition of "person" from the enactment of the MCRA. Id.; Sarvis, 711 N.E.2d at 920.
119. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7 (emphasis added).
120. Id. d. 23.
121. Sarvis, 711 N.E.2d at 920.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 920-2l.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 920 n.lO.
126. Swan set Dev. Corp. v. City of T::unton, 668 N.E.2d 333, 334 (Mass. 1996).
127. Id.
128. Chaabouni v. City of Boston, 133 F. Supp. 2d 93, 102-03 (D. Mass. 2001);
Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 744 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).
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The United States District Court for the District of Massachu
setts, in deciding Chaabouni v. City of Boston, dismissed an MCRA
claim against the City of Boston, finding that it was not a "person"
for the purposes of the MCRA.129 The plaintiff in Chaabouni filed
suit after several city police officers allegedly violated his constitu
tional rights during a traffic stop.130 He sought to recover damages
from the city under both § 1983 and the MCRA.l3l The court dis
missed his § 1983 claim for failure to allege that his injury was re
lated to an unconstitutional official policy or custom. 132 Based on
the § 1983 dismissal, the City argued the MCRA claim should also
be dismissed because the MCRA and § 1983 "'are parallel statutes,
coextensive with each other.' "133
The court found the City's argument "facially appealing," but
"fundamentally flawed,"134 noting significant differences between
§ 1983 and the MCRA.B 5 According to the court, Sarvis added to
these differences when it rejected the use of the "custom or policy"
test in the case of private employers. 136 Although Sarvis undercut
the city's argument, it was also the basis for the court's dismissal of
the claims against the city because the city is not a "person" under
the MCRA.137 The court relied on the Sarvis holding that the MDS
definition of "person" applies to the MCRA and Sarvis dicta sug
gesting that "person" does not include municipal corporations.1 38
As noted above, the MDS definition of "person" includes cor
porations, societies, associations, and partnerships.139 Massachu
setts courts have generally held that the word "corporation" as used
in the definition of "person" and "whoever" does not encompass
Chaabouni, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 93, 103.
130. Id. at 94-95. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that city police officers
"pulled him from his vehicle and proceeded to handcuff, assault, and beat him." Id. at
94. Plaintiffs complaint included five counts. Id. at 94-95. This Note only addresses
the court's analysis of the fifth count in which plaintiff alleged his State and Federal civil
rights were violated. Id. at 99-103.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 99.
133. Id. at 101 (quoting Canney v. City of Chelsea, 925 F. Supp. 58, 68 (D. Mass.
1996)).
134. Id.
135. Id. As the court noted, the MCRA applies to private actors and applies only
where the civil rights violation involves "threats, intimidation, or coercion." Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 101-03.
138. Id. at 101-02.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 118-121.
129.
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municipal corporations. 14o The words "corporation" and "person"
as used in other statutes have also been found to exclude municipal
corporations, despite the text of the MDS.141
One exception to this rule occurred when the Supreme Judicial
Court decided Attorney General v. City of Woburn. 142 In Woburn,
the court held that the Department of Public Health could fine the
City pursuant to a law that applied to "[w]hoever permits the en
trance or discharge into any part of the ... river ... of sewage or of
any other substance injurious to public health or tending to create a
public nuisance. "143 The statute did not explicitly include govern
ment entities or municipalities among the entities defined by "who
ever," yet the court held that the statute must be read to include
municipalities because to do otherwise would frustrate the purpose
of the statute. l44
Without mentioning Woburn, the Chaabouni court adopted
the Sarvis conclusion that "[t]here is nothing in the MCRA to indi
cate clearly that the legislature did not intend the term 'person' to
take on the statutory definition appearing in [the MDS]."145 The
court observed that if the legislature intended the MCRA to abro
gate common law sovereign immunity for municipalities, it would
have used explicit language to indicate its intent.146
140. Commonwealth v. Voight, 556 N.E.2d 115, 116-17 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990)
(holding that the legislature's inclusion of corporations as "persons" does not extend to
municipal corporations); see also City of New Bedford v. New Bedford, Woods Hole,
Martha's Vineyard, & Nantucket Steamship Auth., 107 N.E.2d 513, 517 (Mass. 1952)
(stating that the statutory definition of "person" does not include municipalities); How
ard v. Chicopee, 12 N.E.2d 106, 110 (Mass. 1938) (construing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4,
§ 7 definition of "person" to exclude municipalities). But see Att'y Gen. v. City of
Woburn, 79 N.E.2d 187 (Mass. 1948) (holding statute applied to municipal corporations
despite use of the word "whoever" because excluding municipalities would undermine
the purpose of the statute).
141. O'Donnell v. N. Attleborough, 98 N.E. 1084, 1085-86 (Mass. 1912) (relying
on history and organization of statutes to show that legislature distinguishes between
"private or moneyed" from "public or municipal" corporations and that therefore "per
son or corporation" does not include municipalities).
142. City of Woburn, 79 N.E.2d 187.
143. Id. at 188.
144. Id. at 188-89. The purpose of the statute was to prevent pollution in the
river, a purpose which could only be achieved if all parties, including municipalities,
were prohibited from polluting the river. Id.
145. Chaabouni v. City of Boston, 133 F. Supp. 2d 93, 102 (D. Mass. 2001) (quot
ing Sarvis v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 711 N.E.2d 911, 921 (Mass. App. Ct.
1999».
146. Id. at 102-03. In its cursory discussion of the relationship between the
MCRA and the "ancient protection of sovereign immunity," the court suggested that
because there was a long tradition of common law sovereign immunity for municipali
ties, any legislature wishing to abrogate that immunity would have done so quite explic
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Several months after Chaabouni, the Massachusetts Appeals
Court also concluded, in Howcroft v. City of Peabody, "that a mu
nicipality is not a 'person' covered by the [MCRA]."147 The plain
tiff in Howcroft was a former police officer in the City of
Peabody.148 While employed as a police officer, the plaintiff sought
to have state restrictions on smoking in public buildings enforced in
the police station where he worked. 149 The plaintiff's superiors did
not respond to his legitimate complaints and instead retaliated by
subjecting him to additional smoke in the workplace and wrongly
punishing him for supposed abuse of sick leave policies. I50 Eventu
ally, the plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against the city and
the individual officers alleging violation of his civil rights under
both § 1983 and the MCRA, intentional infliction of emotional dis
tress, and intentional interference with advantageous relation
ships.l51 The trial court allowed the defendants' motions for
summary judgment on all counts. I52 On appeal, the court upheld
the dismissal of all claims against the city and the officers in their
official capacities, but reversed and remanded all claims against the
officers in their individual capacities. 153
In its ruling, the Appeals Court first addressed the relationship
between the municipal liability allowed under § 1983 and the
MCRA.154 According to the court, municipalities are liable under
§ 1983 because of the specific legislative history relating to its use of
the word "person," including passage of the Federal Dictionary
Act, as explained in Monell. I55 The court, however, did not adopt
the § 1983 position.l 56 Instead, it stated "[t]hat legislative history
has no bearing on the MCRA" because the word "person" as de
fined by the MDS does not apply to political subdivisions. I57 The
itly. Id. Although the court discussed the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, which largely
abrogated that traditional sovereign immunity elsewhere in its opinion, it does not note
the temporal proximity between the passage of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, in
1977, and the MCRA, in 1979.
147. Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 744 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).
148. Id. at 733.
149. Id. at 733-39.
150. Id. at 734-37.
151. Id. at 733, 748. Specifically, Howcroft alleged "that his First Amendment
right to speak out on a matter of public interest had been infringed." Id.
152. Id. at 744.
153. ld. at 733, 748.
154. ld. at 744.
155. ld.; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
156. Howcroft, 747 N.E.2d at 744; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
157. Howcroft, 747 N.E.2d at 744.
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court concluded that the legislature would have used explicit lan
guage if it intended the MCRA to apply to "persons" not defined as
such in the MDS.1 58

II.

ANALYSIS

Despite the conclusions of the Howcroft and Chaabouni
courts, evidence suggests that the legislature intended municipali
ties to be liable under the MCRA. The available legislative history
indicates that the MCRA was viewed as a broad, remedial stat
ute. 159 Excluding municipal liability would frustrate that purpose,
indicating that the legislature intended the word "person" to have a
less restrictive definition than the one in the MDS.160 Additionally,
the legislature modeled the MCRA after § 1983, indicating the in
tent to reach the actors subject to § 1983 liability, including munici
pal corporations, and those "not acting under color of law" who
would be beyond the reach of § 1983. 161 The introduction of the
MCRA occurred shortly after the Supreme Court decided Mo
nell.1 62 At that time, municipal corporations had been brought
under the reach of § 1983, and subsequent cases had not yet limited
the reach according to the "policy or custom" test.1 63 Together, the
modeling and the timing further indicate the legislature'S intent to
reach municipal corporations. Therefore, explicit language limiting
common law sovereign immunity was unnecessary. For these rea
sons, the MCRA should be recognized as applying to municipal
corporations.
158. Id. at 745.
159. See supra Part I.C
160. Not only would eliminating liability for municipal employers have reduced
the effectiveness of the MCRA as a deterrent against future civil rights violations, it
would have been out of step with recent changes to sovereign immunity in Massachu
setts. In 1977, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had abrogated the state's sov
ereign immunity doctrine, opening the door to tort liability for government entities,
including municipalities. Whitney v. City of Worcester, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1220 (Mass.
1977). The following year the Massachusetts legislature responded by enacting the
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, modeled on the Federal Tort Claims Act. Mark L. Van
Valkenburgh, Note, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 258, Section 10: Slouching To
ward Sovereign Immunity, 29 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1079, 1092 (1995). Under the Massa
chusetts Tort Claims Act, public employers became liable for certain actions of their
employees for the first time in Massachusetts history. [d.
161. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § llH (2004).
162. Monell was decided on June 6, 1978, and H.R. 3135 was introduced in Janu
ary of 1979. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); JOURNAL OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 1979,
at 2856 (1979).
163. See infra notes 209-210 and accompanying text.
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AvaiLabLe LegisLative History Indicates Intent for MCRA to
Include MunicipaL Liability

Circulated copies of H.R. 3135, the bill that became the
MCRA, bore the description "BILL for the protection of the civil
rights of persons in the commonwealth."164 The description does
not suggest that the protections are limited to violations by individ
uals and private employers. The documents from the Department
of the Attorney General are also silent as to the exclusion of munic
ipalliability.
As described above, the three documents from the Depart
ment of the Attorney General include two letters and a transcript
of testimony provided to the Joint Committee on the Judiciary be
tween the writing of the two letters. 165 The attorney general's views
about the scope of H.R. 3135 are especially relevant because the
attorney general petitioned for the bill.1 66 Additionally, at least
some members of the legislature considered H.R. 3135 to be the
"Attorney General's Civil Rights Bill."167
In the earliest letter, dated March 7, 1979, Massachusetts At
torney General Bellotti described the purpose of H.R. 3135 in a
single sentence. He wrote: "If enacted, this bill would provide
needed access to the courts and effective remedies in matters in
164. H.R. 3135, 171st Gen. Court (Mass. 1979) (on file at the Massachusetts
Archives in the Legislative Packet for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on file with Western
New England Law Review). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has recognized
that the title of a bill can be considered when a court is interpreting a statute. Com
monwealth v. Graham, 445 N.E.2d 1043, 1046 (Mass. 1983) ("While the title to an act
cannot control the provisions of the statute, the title may be used for the purpose of
ascertaining its proper limitations."); see also Lynn Teachers Union, Local 1037 v. Mass.
Comm'n Against Discrim., 549 N.E.2d 97, 102 (Mass. 1990) (holding that a statute enti
tled "An Act relative to the dismissal of certain persons from employment or the re
fusal to employ such persons due to age" should not be applied to limit the protections
available to victims of other types of discrimination).
165. Letter from Francis X. Bellotti, Att'y Gen. of the Commonwealth of Mass.,
to Sen. Alan D. Sisitsky, & Rep. Michael Flaherty, Joint Comm. on the Judiciary, supra
note 71, at 1; Robert H. Bohn, Jr., Chief of the Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Division of
the Dep't of the Att'y Gen. of the Commonwealth of Mass., Testimony Regarding
House Bill No. 3135 Before the Joint Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 73, at 3;
Letter from Thomas R. Kiley, First Assistant Att'y Gen. of the Commonwealth of
Mass., to Neil Lynch, Counsel to the Gov., supra note 74, at 3.
166. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS 1979, at 2856.
167. Memorandum from House Staff to Rep. Michael Flaherty, Chairman, Joint
Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 16, 1979) (on file at the Massachusetts Archives in the
Governor's File for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on file with Western New England Law
Review) (referring to the bill as "House Bill No. 3135-Attorney General's Civil Rights
Bill").
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volving deprivation of constitutional and statutory rights by persons
acting under color of state law or otherwise."168 By using the
phrase "persons acting under color of state law or otherwise," Bel
lotti indicated that he expected H.R. 3135 to provide a remedy
against both private parties and those acting in an official capacity.
The phrase also implies a connection to § 1983, which uses similar
language,169 and signals that H.R. 3135 would cover all persons sub
ject to § 1983, as well as those acting in a purely private capacity
who would not otherwise be subject to suit. Private actors who
could not be reached under § 1983 are not singled out as the special
targets of the proposed legislation. 170 Instead, the attorney general
emphasized that H.R. 3135 would supply his department something
it lacked-specific authority to take either criminal or civil action to
address civil rights violations.1 71
Finally, he stressed that the deterrent effect H.R. 3135 would
have if adopted.172 He argued that providing his department and
victims of civil rights violations with" [s]pecific authority to institute
suit would ... discourag[e] future similar violations by persons act
ing under color of state law or otherwise. "173 If, as Bellotti sug
gested at the end of his letter, H.R. 3135 was intended to deter
those acting on their own and those acting in their official capaci
ties, it seems reasonable that the bill would reach municipal em
ployers. After all, unless municipalities were made liable for the
tortious conduct of their employees, the municipality would have
little incentive to provide the type of training and oversight neces
sary to prevent future abusesp4
That first letter was delivered to the legislature by Robert
Bohn, Chief of the Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Division of the De
partment of the Attorney General, who reiterated Bellotti's points
in his testimony before the Joint Committee on the Judiciary on
168. Letter from Francis X. Bellotti, Att'y Gen. of the Commonwealth of Mass.,
to Sen. Alan D. Sisitsky & Rep. Michael Flaherty, Joint Comm. on the Judiciary, supra
note 71, at l.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (using the phrase, "any person who, under color of
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State").
170. Id.
171. /d. at 2.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations,
89 HARV. L. REV. 922, 927 (1976) (arguing "[t]he threat of monetary judgments against
governmental units may ... spur higher officials to design their hiring and training
programs, disciplinary procedures, and internal rules so as to curb misconduct").
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March 7, 1979.115 Bohn concluded his testimony by suggesting that
legislators consider two points in their deliberations.116 First, he
pointed out that H.R. 3135 would provide the Civil Rights-Civil
Liberties Division with specific authority and responsibility, some
thing its employees had lacked since the division had been created
by earlier legislation. l77 Second, Bohn noted that H.R. 3135 would
not place all of the power and responsibility for enforcement on the
Department of the Attorney General. 178 One of the main benefits
of providing a private right of action, as Bohn saw it, was to leave
the "Attorney General ... free to fulfill his statutory responsibility
of representing state agencies."179 This wording is somewhat am
biguous in that Bohn could have been referring to either the gen
eral duties of the attorney general or the specific obligations the
attorney general would have to represent state agencies in suits
brought under the provisions of the MCRA. However, a similar
phrase used in the department's second letter written in support of
H.R. 3135 suggests that Bohn was speaking about the specific suits
that might occur if H.R. 3135 were adopted. 180
The second letter, written in November 1979 by Thomas Kiley,
the then-First Assistant Attorney General, was addressed to Neil
Lynch, Counsel to the Governor. 181 Kiley's letter responded to a
request for the position of the Department of the Attorney General
regarding H.R. 3135. 182 The letter included language almost identi
cal to that used by Bohn in his testimony.1 83 Like Bohn, Kiley indi
cated that the attorney general had been unable to support earlier
state civil rights bills because all enforcement was left to his depart
ment. 184 Kiley went further than either the attorney general or
Bohn, emphasizing the importance of the provision of the bill that
allowed private attorneys to bring suits, "thus leaving the Attorney
General free to fulfill his statutory responsibility ... to represent
state agencies should they be sued under the new statute for alleged
175. Robert H. Bohn, Jr., Chief of the Civil Rights·Civil Liberties Division of the
Dep't of the Att'y Gen. of the Commonwealth of Mass., Testimony Regarding House
Bill No. 3135 Before the Joint Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 73.
176. Id. at 2.
177. Id. at 3.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See infra text accompanying notes 183-186.
181. Letter from Thomas R. Kiley, First Assistant Att'y Gen. of the Common
wealth of Mass., to Neil Lynch, Counsel to the Gov., supra note 74, at 1.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 3.
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civil rights violations. 185 Here, Kiley explicitly referred to the re
sponsibility of the attorney general to defend state agencies in cases
brought under the proposed statute, not simply the attorney gen
eral's routine obligations.
As indicated by Kiley's phrasing, the scope of H.R. 3135 as
envisioned by the attorney general included the possibility that suits
would be filed against state agencies. Such suits would, of course,
only be possible if the MCRA waived the protections of sovereign
immunity. Since the sovereign immunity protection for municipali
ties emanates from the power of the state, it seems unlikely that the
state would choose to waive its own liability while leaving munici
palities immune.1 86 Additionally, there is nothing in the statute to
suggest that municipalities and the state should receive different
treatment. Together, the documents from the Department of the
Attorney General indicate that the sponsor of H.R. 3135 viewed the
bill as providing a broad remedy to citizens whose rights had been
violated. Such an intent is incompatible with the exclusion of mu
nicipal liability.
B.

Applying the MDS Definition of "Person" to the MCRA
Would Improperly Frustrate the Purpose of the Statute

The MDS does not require the use of its definition of "person"
where the legislature clearly expresses a desire to use another defi
nition. 187 The text of the preamble specifies that the definitions set
forth shall not apply if "a contrary intention clearly appears" in a
statute.1 88 When a statute contains its own set of definitions or ex
pressly adopts a definition from elsewhere, this standard is obvi
ously met.1 89 Both Howcroft and Chaabouni treat the absence of
specific language in the MCRA adopting a contrary definition as
sufficient proof that the MDS definition, excluding municipal cor
185.

[d.

186. In Whitney v. City of Worcester, the court noted that forty-five states had at
least partially eliminated immunity as a defense for municipalities, while thirty-seven
states had limited or eliminated the defense for actions against those states. Whitney v.
City of Worcester, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1213 (Mass. 1977). Following Whitney, and shortly
before the enactment of the MCRA, the Massachusetts legislature enacted the Massa
chusetts Tort Claims Act, which partially eliminated the immunity defense for all public
employers, a category that includes, amongst other entities, the state, counties, cities,
and towns. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, §§ 1-11 (2004).
187. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7, cl. 23.
188. [d. § 7.
189. Cf Glass v. Glass, 157 N.E. 621, 622 (Mass. 1927) (disregarding the defini
tion of "inhabitant" found in Mass. Gen. Laws c. 4, § 7 because the provisions of the
relevant statute were controlling).
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porations, should apply.190 However, the very purpose of the law
suggests a contrary intention.
The Woburn case demonstrates how the legislature can implic
itly adopt a non-MDS definition. In that case, the state Depart
ment of Public Health sought to enjoin the City of Woburn from
polluting the Aberjona River and its tributaries. 191 The Depart
ment's asserted authority came from a statute that "authorized and
directed" the Department of Public Health to prohibit the pollution
of the Aberjona River and its tributaries and to fine "[w]hoever
permits the entrance or discharge [of sewage] into any part of" the
River. 192 The statute did not explicitly include government entities
or municipalities, yet the Supreme Judicial Court decided that the
Department of Health could use the statute to compel a municipal
ity to change its behavior. 193
In justifying its decision to read the statute as applying to mu
nicipalities, the Supreme Judicial Court said: "Manifestly the pur
pose of the legislation is the protection of public health. The
attainment of this object would hardly be possible if cities and
towns were free to . . . [pollute] the river."194 The court found this
intent even though the statute did not explicitly create liability for
cities, towns, municipalities, municipal corporations, or governmen
tal subdivisions. 195 In fact, the word "whoever" provides the only
indication of the parties that the law can reach. 196
The court based its holding in part on the fact that the statute
used the word "whoever" rather than "persons. "197 This distinction
is unimpressive, however, because the two words are defined to
gether and identically in the MDS.1 98 Thus, the court's rationale
that legislative intent could signal a different meaning than the one
used in the MDS would have been equally applicable had the word
"person" been used. Both "whoever" and "person" apply to the
190. See supra text accompanying notes 145, 155-158.
191. Att'y Gen. v. City of Woburn, 79 N.E.2d 187 (Mass. 1948).
192. Id. at 188 n.2 (citing 1911 Mass. Acts 252).
193. Id. at 189.
194. Id.
195. The full text of the statute (1911 Mass. Acts 252) appears in Attorney Gen
eral v. City of Woburn. Id. at 188 n.2.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 189 (suggesting that had the statute referred to "persons," it would not
have been less clear whether the statute was applicable to municipalities, but not find
ing the use of the word "whoever" sufficient to determine that the statute did not apply
to municipalities).
198. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7, cI. 23 (2004) ('''Person' or 'whoever' shall in
clude corporations, societies, associations and partnerships.").
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same entities, including corporations. 199 Earlier cases involving the
terms "person" and "corporation" were consistently interpreted as
exclusive of municipalities. 20o However, the Woburn court implied
that other definitions could be legitimate, at least some of the
time. 201
Indeed, there is a single substantive point underlying the
court's finding that the statute "as a whole manifests an intention to
include municipalities."202 The substantive argument is that
"[c]ities and towns are quite as capable of causing the mischief
which the statute is designed to prevent as are private persons and
corporations.''203 Despite the absence of explicit statutory language
including municipalities, the Woburn court looked to the whole
purpose of the anti-dumping statute at issue in that case. Similarly,
courts should look to the entire, remedial purpose of the MCRA
and not apply the restrictive MDS definition of the word "person."
The MCRA was enacted "for the protection of the civil rights
of persons in the commonwealth."204 Its scope was not limited to
private actors, as the phrase "whether or not acting under color of
law" demonstrates. 205 To exclude municipalities from liability
under the MCRA would compromise the purpose of the statute in
the same way that allowing the City of Woburn to continue dump
ing would have frustrated the purpose of the anti-dumping stat
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., City of New Bedford v. New Bedford, Wood's Hole, Martha's Vine
yard, & Nantucket Steamship Auth., 107 N.E.2d 513, 517 (Mass. 1952) (quoting
O'Donnell v. N. Attleborough, 98 N.E. 1084 (Mass. 1912) for the proposition that regu
lation of corporations does not extend to municipal corporations); Donahue v. City of
Newburyport, 98 N.E. 1081 (Mass. 1912) (holding that the statute making "persons"
liable for certain accidents did not extend liability to municipal corporations);
O'Donnell v. N. Attleborough, 98 N.E. 1084, 1085 (Mass. 1912) ("It has been a general
rule in our legislation that statutes passed for the regulation of the rights and liabilities
of corporations are to be applied only to private or moneyed corporations and not to
public or municipal corporations or quasi corporations."); Commonwealth v. Voight,
556 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that plaintiff did not violate the statute
criminalizing harassing phone calls because calls to a municipal emergency number
were not made to a "person").
201. Att'y Gen. v. City of Woburn, 79 N.E.2d 187, 188-89 (Mass. 1948). Specifi
cally, the court noted that the traditional approach was "usually" adopted, implying that
sometimes municipalities are "persons" or "corporations." Id.
202. Id. at 189.
203. Id.
204. H.R. No. 3135, 1979 Gen. Court (Mass. 1979) (on file at the Massachusetts
Archives in the Legislative Packet for 1979 Mass. Acts 915) (copy on file with Western
New England Law Review).
205. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § llH (2004).
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ute. 206 If the statute had not applied to Woburn, the city would
have had little incentive to stop dumping waste and the river would
have remained polluted, even if all private parties quit dumping.
Similarly, if municipalities are relieved from liability under the
MCRA, they will have less incentive to properly train and supervise
their employees. As a result, the risk that an employee will un
knowingly abuse her power or authority in violation of the civil
rights of another will remain.
C.

The Timing and Text of the MCRA Strongly Suggest the
Legislature Intended the MCRA to Include
Municipal Liability

Massachusetts courts have repeatedly found that the MCRA
was modeled on § 1983.207 In Batchelder, the Supreme Judicial
Court "presumed" the legislature was "aware of the use and mean
ing" of the term "prevail" in an analogous federal civil rights stat
ute. 208 Since the statute was modeled on § 1983 and the legislature
knew about the federal meaning given to "prevail," the court as
sumed that the legislature had intended to use the federal meaning
in the MCRA.209 Four years later, in Duarte, the Supreme Judicial
Court held that the legislature was aware of current § 1983 case law
when it adopted the MCRA and therefore the contemporary
"clearly established" § 1983 case law was incorporated into the
MCRA.21O Batchelder and Duarte both assume that the legislature
knew about the case law interpreting federal civil rights legislation
and intended to incorporate that body of law into the MCRA.211
Applying this assumption to the question of the intended meaning
of th~ word "person" in the MCRA means finding that the legisla
ture was aware of recent changes to the meaning of "person" as
used in § 1983, and intended to adopt those changes in the MCRA.
In June of 1978, approximately six months before H.R. 3135
was introduced in the Massachusetts legislature, the Supreme Court
206. City of Woburn, 79 N.E.2d at 189 (stating that the purpose of the statute at
issue in that case, preventing pollution of the Aberjona River, would be frustrated if
municipalities were free to continue polluting the river).
207. See, e.g., Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 473 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (Mass.
1985) (finding that the MCRA was "intended to provide a remedy ... coextensive with
42 V.S.c. § 1983"); Duarte v. Healy, 537 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Mass. 1989) (finding the
legislature "chose to pattern the [MCRA] after § 1983").
208. Batchelder, 473 N.E.2d at 1130; see also 42 V.S.c. § 1988 (2000).
209. Batchelder, 473 N.E.2d at 1130.
210. Duarte, 537 N.E.2d at 1232.
211. See supra notes 89-94, 100-102 and accompanying text.
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decided Monell, overruling Monroe to hold that municipalities
were "persons" within the meaning of § 1983.212 The ability of
plaintiffs to successfully sue cities was subsequently restricted by
the requirement, introduced in Monell, that municipalities would be
liable only to the extent of a "policy or custom."213 However, at the
time H.R. 3135 was introduced, the scope of the "policy or custom"
requirement articulated in Monell was not yet clear. 214 Therefore,
applying the assumptions made about the knowledge of the legisla
ture in Batchelder and Duarte, it seems that the legislature was
aware of the change and intended to incorporate it into the
MCRA.215
The import of the change wrought by Monell further supports
the assumption that the legislature was aware of this particular as
pect of the case law regarding § 1983 at the time they considered
the MCRA.216 Monell came seventeen years after Monroe. During
these seventeen years, the limits to plaintiff recovery caused by the
restrictive definition of "person" adopted in Monroe were repeat
edly challenged in the pages of law reviews,21? in courts,218 and even
by state legislatures. 219
Plaintiffs continued to try to reach responsible municipali
ties,220 and the case law evolved as parties and courts found a num
ber of approaches to do so. One approach offered some courts a
relatively clear way around the limitations on § 1983 articulated in
212. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978).
213. Susanah M. Mead, 42 U.s.c. § 1983, Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch
Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. REv. 517, 554-66 (1987) (discussing the extent
to which the "policy or custom" test has impaired the ability of plaintiffs to bring suits
and recover damages).
214. Arthur D. Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary
Act of 1925: The Plenary Docket in the 1970's, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1760 n.188
(1978) (viewing the Monell decision as allowing municipalities to be sued without clear
restrictions); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns
and Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 539, 564 (1989)
(discussing the initial confusion of lower courts about the significance of the "policy or
custom" requirement articulated in Monell, because there was no statutory basis for the
requirement).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 88-93, 98-102.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 45-59.
217. E.g., Shapo, supra note 26, at 277; Don B. Kates, Jr. & J. Anthony Kouba,
Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 131,132 (1972); Ronald M. Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine,
65 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1483 (1977).
218. See infra note 226.
219. See infra note 223.
220. Blum, supra note 45, at 414-20.
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Monroe. 221 During the 1960s and 1970s, a number of states modi
fied their common law rules of sovereign immunity to allow suits
against municipalities, the state, or both.222 By 1971, seventeen
states had acted to make local governments liable for the torts of
their officials, and in another seven states municipalities were simi
larly liable, though only to the extent of their insurance coverage. 223
Massachusetts eventually became part of this trend when, the year
before the legislature passed the MCRA, the Massachusetts Tort
Claims Act was adopted. 224 Adoption of the Massachusetts Tort
Claims Act suggests that the legislature was concerned with the
harm done to its citizens by traditional sovereign immunity
exclusions.
Given the high profile of the restrictive definition of "person"
advanced in Monroe, the legislators were likely to have known
about the rejection and replacement of the definition in Monell as
they considered the adoption of the MCRA. Although the Su
preme Court supported its decision to overrule the Monroe defini
tion of "person" with a thorough review of the relevant legislative
history, the result ultimately served a pragmatic purpose, on its face
improving the ability of § 1983 to protect citizens from civil rights
violations. 225 Given the intense criticism of the Monroe definition
that preceded Monell, it is likely that the Massachusetts legislature
intended to make cities liable under the MCRA.
221. Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 u.s.c. § 1983, 55 MINN.
L. REV. 1201, 1218 (1971) [hereinafter Developing Governmental Liability]. The ap
proach was not completely free of pitfalls. Reconciling § 1983, § 1988, and state law
was analytically tricky because § 1983 had been interpreted as excluding liability and
§ 1988 expressly allowed the incorporation of state law only where consistent with fed
erallaw. /d. The courts that followed this approach essentially had to see the exclusion
in § 1983 as a gap, rather than an intentional exclusion. Id. at 1218-19.
222. Id. at 1216-17 n.75.
223. Id. In Arizona, California, Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, New York,
North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin, both the state and the political subdivi
sions were liable. Id. In Alaska, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Oklahoma,
and Virginia, only municipalities were liable. Id. at 1217. Legislatures imposed liability
in California, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Nevada, New York, North
Carolina, Virginia, and Washington. Id. at 1216-17. In the other states-Arizona, Illi
nois, Michigan, New Jersey, and Wisconsin-liability was imposed via judicial decision.
Id. Additionally, statutes in Idaho, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Da
kota, Vermont, and Wyoming made municipalities with insurance liable up to the
amount of insurance coverage. Id. at 1217.
224. 1978 Mass. Acts 842 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
258, §§ 1-11 (2004».
225. Eric Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
213,213-15 (1979) (describing practicaiproblems with Monroe, including that the dam
ages available were often inversely proportional to the seriousness of the violation).
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The second approach was to bring a § 1983 action against the
individual perpetrator and then join to it a claim, directly under the
Constitution, against the municipality.226 Some courts in jurisdic
tions that explicitly allowed suits against municipalities adopted a
second approach, permitting recovery under state law in federal
court.227 Courts using this approach read § 1983 together with 42
U.S.c. § 1988.228 Under § 1988, state remedies must be applied
where federal civil rights law lacks an appropriate remedy so long
as the state's law furthers the purpose of federal civil rights law and
is consistent with the Constitution and other federallaw. 229
CONCLUSION

The decisions of the federal district court and Massachusetts
Appeals Court that municipalities are not "persons" subject to lia
bility under the MCRA avoid the issue of whether municipal corpo
rations, like private employers, should be subject to respondeat
superior liability. Instead, municipal corporations have limited lia
bility under § 1983, and no liability under the MCRA. As a result,
the reach of the MCRA is reduced, plaintiffs whose rights have
been violated by municipal employees are less likely to recover ap
propriate damages, and there is less incentive for cities and towns to
try to prevent employee violations through training and discipline.
Narrowing the scope of the MCRA in this way frustrates the pur
pose of the law to provide a broad remedy for civil rights violations.
Although the legislature did not explicitly reject the MDS defi
nition of "person" that excludes municipalities from liability under
the MCRA, the text of the bill and circumstances of its passage
support a more inclusive definition. The asserted purpose of the
statute, its resemblance to § 1983, and the timing of its introduction
all indicate that the legislature meant for the MCRA to reach both
private actors and those people who are liable under § 1983 be
cause their actions were "under color" of state law. 230 Therefore,
the holdings of Howcroft and Chaabouni should be overturned and
226. E.g., Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir. 1975); Hostrop v.
Bd. of Junior Coli. Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975); Construction Indus.
Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975); Traylor v. City of Amarillo, 492
F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1974).
227. Developing Governmental Liability, supra note 221, at 1214-16.
228. Id. at 1214.
229. Id. at 1201-02, 1215-16.
230. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § llH (2004).
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courts should expand on Sarvis 231 so that all Massachusetts employ
ers-including municipalities-are held liable under the MCRA for
the acts of employees, thus increasing incentives for municipal cor
porations to train employees to comply with the law.
Margaret R. Solis*

See supra text accompanying notes 112-123.
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